New Federal and Provincial Personal Information Protection Legislation and its Impact on Physicians and Public Hospitals by Prokopieva, Evguania
Canadian Journal of Law and Technology 
Volume 4 Number 1 Article 3 
1-1-2005 
New Federal and Provincial Personal Information Protection 
Legislation and its Impact on Physicians and Public Hospitals 
Evguania Prokopieva 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/cjlt 
Recommended Citation 
Evguania Prokopieva, "New Federal and Provincial Personal Information Protection Legislation and its 
Impact on Physicians and Public Hospitals" (2005) 4: 1 CJLT 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Canadian Journal of Law and Technology by an authorized editor of Schulich Law 
Scholars. For more information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca. 
New Federal and Provincial Personal Information
Protection Legislation and its Impact on Physicians and
Public Hospitals 
Evguenia Prokopieva†
Interaction between Federal andIntroduction 
Provincial Personal Information
Protection Legislation and Standardsrotection of personal information has become oneP of the most debatable issues in legal literature. Rap- Existing in Other Sources 
idly developing technologies make it increasingly easy to PIPEDA was enacted in 2000. Since January 1, 2004,
combine publicly available personal data from various it has been in full force and effect. A number of prov-
sources and use that information equally for beneficial or inces have enacted their own personal data protection
detrimental purposes. Along with technological changes, legislation, whether general or sectoral. Ontario is one of
the enactment of the federal Personal Information Pro- the provinces that has concentrated on protection of
tection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA)1  and personal health information. The new Ontario Personal
provincial personal data protection legislation2 has also Health Information Protection Act (PHIPA)8 came into
contributed to these debates. force on November 1, 2004.
Maintaining control over one’s personal health Before embarking on a discussion about implica-
information in particular has been hotly disputed, due to tions of PIPEDA and PHIPA for doctors and public hos-
the inherent sensitivity of our medical records. 3 Many pitals, I will explore a more basic issue. Is there even a
would argue that because of the nature of personal need for new legislation protecting personal health infor-
health information, its protection is fundamental to the mation? What is the relationship between the federal
health care system and should be the default option as and provincial personal information protection legisla-
opposed to public disclosure or disclosure to those who tion, on one hand, and standards for health care profes-
are not the subject. 4 sionals set out by common law and specialized provin-
The focus of this article is to examine the implica- cial statutes such as the Health Care Consent Act, 9 and
tions of the new federal and Ontario personal data pro- professional codes such as the Canadian Medical Associa-
tection legislation for physicians and public hospitals. tion’s Code of Ethics, 10 on the other hand?
This article also inquires into whether the new legisla- One may argue that standards set by common law,
tion will contribute to the protection of patient privacy. provincial statutes, and professional codes for physicians
By ‘‘physician’’ I mean a doctor in a broad sense – i.e., ‘‘a are so high that the adherence to those standards will
person who has been educated, trained, and licensed to automatically lead to compliance with the requirements
practice the art and science of medicine’’. 5 This will of the new personal information protection legislation,
include family doctors, pediatricians, psychiatrists, sur- and both PIPEDA and PHIPA represent an attempt to
geons, and other medical doctors covered by the Regu- impose on public hospitals and physicians redundant
lated Health Professions Act. 6 By the term ‘‘public hospi- obligations amounting to an unnecessary paperwork.
tals’’ I will refer to not-for-profit hospitals as they are Indeed, some health care representatives take the view
defined by the Public Hospitals Act. 7 that
The first part of the article will examine the interre- . . . the application of PIPEDA in the medical system will
lationship between the personal data protection legisla- introduce significant impediments to the delivery of health
care services, while providing virtually no substantivetion and existing standards for physicians. The second
improvements to patient confidentiality over existing laws.part will analyze PIPEDA and its implications for doctors
. . . [T]he medical profession in Ontario is bound by a clearand public hospitals. Lastly, I will analyze the new and concise set of rules with respect to patient confidenti-
Ontario legislation designed to protect personal informa- ality, as found in the Medicine Act, the Health Care Consent
tion in the context of health care and treatment. Act, and augmented by the CMA Code of Ethics. 11
† CCH Canadian Limited. The author wishes to express her gratitude to the Centre of Innovation Law and Policy of the University of Toronto for its
support of this article. The author also wishes to thank Professor Margaret Ann Wilkinson of the Faculty of Law of the University of Western Ontario for her
invaluable support and comments.
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The argument, however, does not stand. First, the the incomplete protection provided by the common law
existing common-law standards of care and rules of pro- and intensified by technological developments’’. 14 It is
fessional conduct for medical practitioners are not believed, therefore, that the new legislation will prevent
designed to protect personal health information. Rather, situations such as where a patient’s records forwarded to
they play the role of ensuring a relationship of trust her treating physician by a laboratory show up on the
between doctors and their patients and set rules of pro- back of flyers distributed in Toronto for a real estate
fessional conduct. The confidentiality of information dis- company. 15
closed in the course of diagnoses and treatment is cer- Third, even if certain obligations under the newtainly a significant part of both trust relationships legislation appear to reiterate corresponding obligationsbetween doctors and their patients and rules of profes- under provincial health care-related statutes, commonsional conduct. Protection of individuals’ confidentiality law, and rules of professional conduct, this appearance isand privacy is also a purpose of the new legislation. The in fact deceptive. Take, for example, the obligation tonew legislation, however, has other objectives which obtain consent. It is true that, under the existing stan-cannot be achieved by the existing standards. For dards, consent is central to the whole system of treat-example, PHIPA purports not only to protect the confi- ment. The right to decide whether a medical interven-dentiality of personal health information and the privacy tion will be accepted is an extension of one’sof individuals with respect to that information, but also fundamental right to bodily integrity and the concept ofto provide individuals with a right of access to their individual autonomy in general. 16 In Ontario, thepersonal health information and a right to require the common-law rules on consent to treatment were codi-correction or amendment of that information. 12 Thus, fied by the Health Care Consent Act. 17 However, con-not only is the new personal data protection legislation sent to treatment by itself is by no means sufficient fordesigned to guard personal health information, but it the purposes of protecting personal health information.also provides for protection of a broader spectrum of Under both PIPEDA and the new Ontario Act, theinterests. requirements of consent are broader. They cover not
Second, the existing common-law standards of care only consent to treatment itself but also consent to col-
and rules of professional conduct apply only to imme- lect, use and disclose information provided by the
diate health care providers (i.e., to physicians in the patient for the purposes of treatment. This, again, dem-
course of treatment of their patients). PHIPA, by contrast, onstrates that the new legislation accords broader protec-
applies to a wide range of entities, called health informa- tion to individuals’ privacy. 18
tion custodians, which include not only physicians and
It may well be, nevertheless, that physicians andother health care providers, but also all kinds of health
public hospitals will use a single consent form to obtaincare facilities, medical officers, pharmacies, and laborato-
consent to treatment and consent to the collection, useries. In certain situations, the new Act applies to persons
and/or disclosure of personal health information for theother than health information custodians. This ensures
purposes of that treatment. The wording of such a formthat personal health information is protected during
should be precise so that the patient is not confused.‘‘secondary uses’’ as well. In other words, the individual’s
Theoretically, it is possible that the patient will give con-privacy is protected not only within the trust relation-
sent to treatment but refuses to give consent with respectship between him and his doctor, but also outside this
to personal health information. In practice, however, thisrelationship. This is true in relation to PIPEDA as well.
may mean that treatment will be impossible, for ade-Technological advances and the specificities of the quate treatment is premised on a full and free exchangehealth care system make it necessary that dozens of of information between doctors and patients.people other than physicians (receptionists, lab techni-
cians, etc.) have access to personal health information. Fourth, the new personal data protection legislation
The nature and extent of these persons’ duties are not equips patients with more ways of enforcing their rights.
clear. Further, due to computerization of records, it is not Failure to obtain a valid consent to treatment will result
always obvious who ‘‘holds’’ information and is, there- in a health care professional’s liability for administering
fore, responsible for its protection. 13 The new legislation treatment without consent19 and may lead to an action
tries to eliminate these difficulties. Both PHIPA and in battery. 20 If consent was obtained but the requirement
PIPEDA are broader than the existing standards of pro- of adequate information is not met (i.e., consent was not
tection in their application. They not only codify rules informed), the patient may commence an action in neg-
found in common law and codes of professional con- ligence. 21 The common-law actions may not always be
duct for physicians, but introduce new concepts and effective because they are expensive and lengthy, or
extend the requirements to supporting staff and other simply because the patient cannot satisfy all required
persons handling records of personal health information. elements of actions. Failure to obtain consent may also
In this respect, both pieces of legislation are a product of lead to a finding of professional misconduct on the part
the evolving Canadian law accommodating the interests of a physician. Thus, ‘‘[p]erforming a professional service
of individuals in today’s technological environment. for which consent is required by law without consent’’
Both acts are designed to respond ‘‘to concerns raised by and ‘‘[g]iving information concerning the condition of a
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patient or any services rendered to a patient to a person PIPEDA and its Potential Impact on
other than the patient or his or her authorized represen- Physicians and Public Hospitals 
tative except with the consent of the patient or his or her
authorized representative or as required by law’’ consti-
Applicability of PIPEDA in General tute acts of professional misconduct22 for the purposes of
It is more than a year since PIPEDA has been in itsthe Health Professions Procedural Code23 and may result
full force and effect. This means that the federal regimein disciplinary actions against the physician. 24 However,
for the protection of personal information in the privatethese provisions do not capture situations of unautho-
sector now applies to all works, undertakings and busi-rized collection, use, or disclosure of personal health
nesses, whether federal or provincial, with respect to col-information as they arise in the context of personal data
lection, use, and disclosure of personal information inprotection in the era of new technological developments.
the course of commercial activities. 27Rather, they are intended to cover cases of administering
treatment without consent and divulging information The application of PIPEDA to organizations
about a patient’s condition and treatment to persons engaged in commercial activities depends on whether
other than the patient (e.g., spouses, children, etc.). the latter involve inter- or intra-provincial dealings. In
case of inter-provincial dealings, the Act applies irrespec-On the other hand, under PIPEDA or PHIPA, failure
tive of the presence or absence of an analogous provin-to obtain a valid consent to collect, use or disclose one’s
cial scheme, whereas in case of intra-provincial dealings,personal health information will lead to a health infor-
the Act applies unless the existing counterpart provincialmation custodian’s liability for the collection, use or dis-
personal data protection law (whether general orclosure of an individual’s information without consent.
sectoral) meets the ‘‘substantially similar’’ test. 28Certainly, neither PIPEDA nor PHIPA protects patients
from physicians’ professional malpractice. Both Acts,
however, broaden remedies available to the patients in ‘‘Substantially Similar’’ Test 
situations of misuse of their personal health information. A provincial personal data protection law is deemedIn cases where the common law or disciplinary actions to be ‘‘substantially similar’’ to PIPEDA if it is ‘‘equal orare ineffective, the patients may well rely on provisions of superior to’’ the latter in the degree of quality of personalthe new legislation. Moreover, according to PHIPA, if the information protection offered. 29 If such is the case, theOntario Information and Privacy Commissioner makes Governor in Council will issue an Order in Councilan order under this Act, or if a person is convicted of an exempting an organization, an activity or a class of orga-offence under this Act, an individual affected by the nizations or activities from compliance with the require-order or conduct that gave rise to the offence may com- ments of PIPEDA to the extent that the latter appliesmence a proceeding in the Superior Court of Justice for within the provincial boundaries. 30damages for actual harm that this individual has suffered
The criteria established by the Minister of Industry,as a result of a contravention of the requirements of
through which the federal government will determine ifPHIPA.25
the ‘‘substantially similar’’ test is met, set out certain
Finally, PHIPA contains various provisions speci- requirements for provincial legislation. ‘‘Substantially
fying changes and amendments that should be made to similar’’ provincial/territorial legislation will be expected
other provincial statutes. It is further provided that in the to:
event of a conflict between a provision of PHIPA or its
— incorporate the ten principles in Schedule 1regulations and a provision of any other Act or its regula- (Section 5) of the PIPEDA, Principles set out intions, PHIPA and its regulations will prevail. 26 The new the National Standard of Canada entitled ModelAct will not take priority only if it is specifically provided Code for the Protection of Personal Informationfor. This suggests that it is the intention of the drafters . . . The principles are accountability, identifyingthat the new Ontario Act and other relevant statutes be purposes, consent, limiting collection, limitingconsistent with each other and operate together, regu- use, disclosure, and retention, accuracy, safe-lating different aspects of the health care practitioners’ guards, openness, individual access, challengingand hospitals’ activities with respect to the collection, use compliance. These principles represent a well-and disclosure of personal health information so as to established consensus on what is necessary toensure a better protection of patient privacy. protect privacy in the contemporary social and
Therefore, it is submitted that the new legislative technological environment. The ten principles
regime is not redundant. Rather, it is designed to both are interrelated, make reference to one another
further and enhance protection of patient privacy in the and should be read together. They do not have
modern technological environment. In the next section, to be enumerated distinctly and separately in
I will describe how physicians and public hospitals are substantially similar legislation – what is impor-
influenced by PIPEDA and PHIPA. tant is that they all be represented. Special
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emphasis will be placed on the principles of As PIPEDA in general, and its application to the
consent, access and correction rights. health care sector40 in particular, ‘‘raises questions about
the division of powers between the federal and provin-— provide for an independent and effective over-
cial governments in this field’’, 41 it was foreseeable thatsight and redress mechanism with powers to
the constitutional validity of the Act would be chal-investigate . . .
lenged. 42 PIPEDA is indeed being challenged now. On
— restrict the collection, use and disclosure of per- December 17, 2003 (i.e., a month after the Exemption
sonal information to purposes that are appro- Order 43 was issued), the Government of Quebec
priate or legitimate. The Personal Information obtained an order from the Quebec Court of Appeal
Protection and Electronic Documents Act allowing it to proceed with a constitutional challenge to
restricts organizations to the collection, use or PIPEDA.44 The Quebec Court of Appeal will be asked to
disclosure of personal information only for pur- answer the question whether PIPEDA is ultra vires the
poses that a reasonable person would consider federal government.
appropriate in the circumstances. . . . Such a pro-
Quebec takes the position that ‘‘the very fact thatvision is meant to ensure that an individual can
PIPEDA requires a provincial law to be excluded fromchallenge illegitimate, unreasonable or inappro-
the purview of PIPEDA (if PIPEDA is not to apply withinpriate collections, uses, disclosures of their infor-
a province) implies that the federal government has themation. Substantially similar legislation will
right to oversee the content of provincial legislation’’ oninclude some reference to the reasonableness
the protection of personal information which is ‘‘incom-and appropriateness of the purposes for which it
patible with the foundations of Canadian federalism’’. 45authorizes the collection, use or disclosure of
It is anticipated that other provinces may join Quebec inpersonal information. 31
this constitutional battle, and that, if the Quebec CourtPIPEDA applies at present in Ontario by default. As
of Appeal answers the question posed in the affirmative,was noted above, on November 1, 2004, the new
an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada will follow.Ontario Act – PHIPA – came into force. However, until
Hence, the constitutionality of PIPEDA may be an uncer-this Act is deemed to be substantially similar to PIPEDA,
tain issue for several years. 46the latter will apply to all sectors of commercial activities
including those in the health sector. An announcement Leaving a further detailed examination of the con-
that the new Ontario Act will be declared substantially stitutionality of PIPEDA outside the scope of this article, I
similar to PIPEDA has already been made. 32 Neverthe- will now turn back to Ontario’s PHIPA and its interrela-
less, even after the Proposed Order becomes effective, tionship with the federal Act. When the Proposed
PIPEDA will continue to apply to commercial activities Order47 becomes effective, PIPEDA will not apply to
in sectors other than health care and, as far as the health Ontario physicians’ and public hospitals’ intra-provincial
care sector is concerned, to all commercial activities commercial dealings.
relating to the exchange of personal health information
When the criteria set out by the federal governmentbetween provinces and territories and to information
for determining substantial similarity are applied to thetransfers outside of Canada. 33
new Ontario piece of legislation, the latter clearly meets
Before going on to discuss the interrelationship the test to be exempted from PIPEDA. All of the 10 prin-
between PIPEDA and PHIPA, I will briefly review the ciples48 are reflected in PHIPA: there are provisions on
development of personal information protection legisla- consent, 49 accountability, 50 openness, 51 security, 52 and
tion in Canada and possible questions about the consti- accuracy, 53 as well as restrictions on the collection, use
tutional validity of PIPEDA. and disclosure of personal health information. 54 The
Historically, Quebec was the first province to enact requirement for the independent and effective mecha-
a law covering issues of the protection of personal infor- nism of review, investigation and redress is also met, for
mation in the private sector. 34 In November 2003, PHIPA contains detailed provisions on administration
Quebec’s private sector personal data protection law was and enforcement. 55 Further, ‘‘[i]t is not required that pro-
deemed substantially similar to PIPEDA by the federal vincial laws are modeled precisely upon PIPEDA in
government and the whole province was exempted from order to be considered substantially similar’’. 56 The fed-
the application of the federal Act. 35 More recently, in eral Act ‘‘. . . affords provinces/territories the flexibility to
January 2004, general laws on personal data protection adopt and tailor their own private sector legislation to
in British Columbia36 and Alberta37 came into force. On the specific needs and conditions of their jurisdiction
April 10, 2004, the federal government found the B.C. while meeting the intent of [PIPEDA] . . . ’’ 57 The Act is
and Alberta statutes to be substantially similar to the ‘‘not trying to prescribe in detail what provinces need to
federal statute. 38 In addition to developing general per- do . . .’’; rather, it sets ‘‘the general standard, and the
sonal data protection legislation, provinces have been provinces can legislate around it’’. 58 Finally, it is possible
also engaged in preparing sectoral laws. Thus, Manitoba, that even sectoral provincial legislation may meet the
Saskatchewan, and Alberta have developed specific legis- ‘‘substantially similar’’ test. 59 All these considerations
lation for personal health information. 39 must have been taken into account when the federal
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government declared its intention to deem PHIPA sub- and it is important to point out some of its implications
stantially similar to PIPEDA. In addition, because of the for physicians and public hospitals. 69
pending constitutional challenge, the federal govern-
ment may have been more willing to find a compromise
with the province. What is ‘‘Commercial Activity’’? 
The next question to be explored is what ‘‘commer-It should be noted, however, that there are some
cial activity’’ in PIPEDA is. ‘‘Commercial activity’’ has adifferences between PHIPA and PIPEDA. In particular,
broad statutory definition under subsection 2(1) of thethe provincial Act takes a more expansive approach to
federal Act:cases of permitted disclosure of personal health informa-
any particular transaction, act or conduct or any regulartion. Thus, according to section 46, a health information
course of conduct that is of a commercial charactercustodian60 shall, upon request of the Minister of Health including the selling, bartering or leasing of donor, member-and Long-Term Care, disclose to the latter personal ship or other fundraising lists.
health information about an individual for the purpose
Thus, the inquiry is not only about the nature of theof monitoring or verifying claims for payment for health
organization in question but also about the nature of thecare funded wholly or in part by the Ministry. This infor-
one particular transaction. As a result, any not-for-profitmation may, however, be disclosed by the Minister to
organizations, including public hospitals, may be caught‘‘any person for a purpose set out’’ in subsection (1) only
by this definition with respect to a certain transaction.‘‘if the disclosure is reasonably necessary for that pur-
Accordingly, public hospitals ought to be cognizant ofpose’’. 61
whether any of their activities are likely to be considered
As well, under section 47, the Minister is entitled to commercial within the meaning of the federal statute.
approve a health data institute and to request the custo- Depending on that, they may have to comply with the
dian to disclose personal health information to that insti- requirements under PIPEDA.
tute for analysis with respect to the management, evalua- It has been suggested that PIPEDA does not extend
tion or monitoring of the resources, their allocation or to core activities of public hospitals. 70 As to what consti-
planning for the health system. The rights of the Minister tute ‘‘core activities’’, it has been commented that an
under this provision are not, however, overreaching. First, institution’s ‘‘core activities’’ are the activities defined
the Minister is required to submit the proposal to the either in a provincial statute regulating that particular
Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioner before industry or in the legal entity’s corporate constitution. 71
requesting the disclosure so that the Commissioner can It follows then that core activities of public hospitals
review and comment on the proposal. 62 In reviewing the include care and treatment. 72 In order to determine
proposal the Commissioner must take into considera- what is covered by ‘‘care’’ and ‘‘treatment’’ as core public
tion the public interest in conducting the analysis and hospital activities, provincial health care-related legisla-
the privacy interests of the concerned individuals. 63 Any tion and specialized medical dictionaries are of some
comments made by the Commissioner must be consid- assistance. ‘‘Health care’’ means ‘‘any observation, exami-
ered by the Minister. 64 Second, a health data institute, to nation, assessment, care, service or procedure that is done
be approved by the Minister for the purposes of the for a health-related purpose’’ and that is carried out or
disclosure, must possess certain qualities. In particular, it provided to diagnose, treat or maintain an individual’s
must have in place practices and procedures approved by physical or mental condition, to prevent disease or injury
the Commissioner to protect the privacy of the individ- or to promote health, or as part of palliative care. 73
uals whose personal health information it receives. 65 ‘‘Care’’ may include ‘‘not only the traditional care of the
Third, the institute that receives personal health informa- acutely or chronically ill patient, but also the prevention
tion must follow certain steps in dealing with this infor- and early detection of disease and the rehabilitation of
mation. For example, the institute must de-identify66 the the disabled’’. 74 On the other hand, ‘‘treatment’’ means
information in question; it can disclose the information ‘‘anything that is done for a therapeutic, preventive, palli-
to the Minister or those approved by the Minister only in ative, diagnostic, cosmetic or other health-related pur-
a de-identified form; it cannot disclose the information pose’’. 75 It includes ‘‘the maintenance, observation, med-
to persons other than the Minister or those approved by ical care and supervision and skilled nursing care of a
the Minister even in a de-identified form.67 patient’’. 76 Generally ‘‘treatment’’ can be defined as med-
ical or surgical management of a patient. 77To conclude on PHIPA’s provisions related to dis-
closure of personal health information, even though the The federal government takes the position that
provincial Act provides for more situations when the ‘‘[t]he funding source (public health insurance, private
information can be disclosed, as was shown above, it payer, third party payer, etc.) is not relevant in deter-
puts reasonable restrictions on disclosure. Hence, there is mining the existence of a commercial activity’’. 78 On this
no surprise that the expectations that the federal govern- view, the Act does not apply to the core activities of
ment exempt provincial health care providers from also public hospitals, not because they are provincially
having to comply with PIPEDA68 will soon be satisfied. funded but because they are ‘‘beyond the constitutional
In the meantime, however, PIPEDA remains in effect, scope of the Act as their core activities are not commer-
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cial in nature’’. 79 Therefore, charging for a private room, This decision demonstrates that the courts may use
for instance, would not make a public hospital subject to various interpretative techniques to restrict the applica-
PIPEDA, for such a transaction is part of the hospital’s tion of PIPEDA to ‘‘the traditional areas of commerce,
core activities (i.e., providing accommodation for care focusing on direct contact between businesses and their
and treatment). 80 On the other hand, certain limited customers and potential customers’’. 90 It also suggests
public hospital activities may be covered by PIPEDA. For that the courts will look at the purpose of the collection,
instance, while PIPEDA does not apply to public hospital use or disclosure of personal information to determine
fundraising activities, such dealings as sales of donor lists whether the information in question was collected, used
may be caught by the Act. 81 or disclosed in the course of commercial activities.
It can be argued that the conclusion that at least Further, the term ‘‘commercial activity’’ has been
core activities of public hospitals do not fall within the interpreted by courts in the context of other legislation
scope of ‘‘commercial activities’’ under PIPEDA is sup- (e.g., in the context of income tax and state immunity
ported by the rules of statutory interpretation. The rules laws). 91 Accordingly, it has been proposed to interpret
mandate courts to consider not only the ordinary the term ‘‘commercial activity’’ in the context of PIPEDA
meaning of words, but also the context and the purpose with the assistance of tests developed by case law, albeit
of the statute in question. 82 In particular, when PIPEDA in a different setting. For example, health care sector
is read with a view to its context and purpose, the courts representatives have recommended the application of
should take into account the legislative history of the Act the so-called ‘‘primary aim’’ or ‘‘preponderant purpose’’
and the original intent of its drafters. It is a fact of the test, which means that an organization’s activity is con-
legislative history that the health care sector did not sidered to be commercial so long as its primary purpose
participate in the drafting of the Model Code for the is ‘‘making a pecuniary gain for the personal benefit of its
Protection of Personal Information83 containing the ten members, as opposed to recovering its costs or pro-
principles now deemed by the Act as essential for the moting its philanthropic, charitable, scientific, health or
protection of personal information and, thus, incorpo- other like object’’. 92 In Re Regional Assessment Commis-
rated directly into the Act. 84 As a result, the Act was sioner and Caisse Populaire de Hearst Ltee., 93 the
prepared without specific consultation with the health Supreme Court of Canada adopted the ‘‘preponderant
care sector. 85 Furthermore, developed in connection purpose’’ test to determine whether an entity was car-
with the federal government’s interest in trade and com- rying on a business and, thus, subject to a business tax.
merce, PIPEDA was not originally intended to be appli- The test is essentially based
cable to the health care sector. 86 The application to the . . . upon a consideration of whether the activity concerned
health care system appears to be an ‘‘incidental’’ or is carried on for the purpose of earning a profit or for some
other preponderant purpose. If the preponderant purpose‘‘ancillary’’ result of the legislative drafting. 87
was other than to make a profit, then even if there were
Turning back to the definition of the term ‘‘com- other characteristics of the organization, including an intent
mercial activity’’, it should be emphasized that its scope in some cases to make a profit . . . , it would not be classed as
a business. 94in the context of PIPEDA will remain unclear until the
courts provide guidance through their decisions on the Since ‘‘carrying on a business’’ and ‘‘being engaged
application of PIPEDA. So far, there has not been any in a ‘commercial activity’’’ have a very close meaning, I
case law directly relevant to the issue of the meaning of would argue that the ‘‘preponderant purpose’’ and ‘‘pri-
the term in the context of PIPEDA. Given, however, the mary aim’’ tests are based on analogous considerations
courts’ willingness to read down the broad language in and, thus, can be employed by the courts while inter-
PIPEDA,88 it is reasonable to expect that the judiciary preting the definition of ‘‘commercial activity’’ in
will take a restrictive view on the interpretation of ‘‘com- PIPEDA. The Court’s ‘‘purposeful’’ analysis in Ferenczy v.
mercial activity’’ as well. In Ferenczy v. MCI Medical MCI Medical Clinics seems to support this argument.
Clinics, 89 for instance, the Court held that although a
There is little doubt that PIPEDA covers privateprivate investigator’s videotape contained personal infor-
labs, 95 private pharmacies, 96 and other for-profit privatemation about the plaintiff collected without her consent
health care facilities, 97 as their activities are clearly ‘‘com-and thus, arguably, obtained and disclosed contrary to
mercial’’ 98 in nature. 99 It is not certain, however, to whatPIPEDA, it was still admissible evidence at trial, for its
extent the Act applies to physicians. Due to the speci-probative value outweighed its possible prejudicial
ficity of the structure of the Canadian health care system,effects. The Court even went on to suggest that the
which is generally described as ‘‘publicly funded yet pri-obtaining and the proposed use of the videotape at trial
vately delivered,’’ 100 Canadian physicians are private for-did not breach PIPEDA at all. The Court employed the
profit contractors. 101 They enter into contracts ‘‘with pro-concept of agency to find that the private investigator
vincial governments through their provincial medicalwas acting as an agent of the defendant physician and,
associations to supply publicly funded health services totherefore, the Act did not apply in this situation because
Canadians’’. 102the defendant was collecting the said personal informa-
tion not in the course of commercial activities but for As was already noted above, the fact that the services
the purpose of defending himself in a legal proceeding. are publicly funded is not relevant in determining
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whether they can be treated as non-commercial. Indeed, Under section 7 of the Act, no personal information
the same physician can deliver services both covered and can be collected, used or disclosed to third parties
not covered by provincial health plans. For instance, a without the knowledge or consent of the individual.
dermatologist can perform on the same patient and at There are, however, some exceptions to this general prin-
the same time two operations: the removal of a carci- ciple. One of them, relates to use and disclosure without
noma which is publicly funded and a cosmetic surgery knowledge or consent for the purposes of statistical, or
which is not publicly funded.103 It is absurd in this situa- scholarly study or research, provided that: first, these pur-
tion to require a treatment record be in compliance with poses cannot be achieved without using or disclosing the
two different regimes just because the operations information; second, the information is used or disclosed
involved have different funding sources. It has been sug- in a manner that will ensure its confidentiality; third, it is
gested, therefore, by commentators, 104 as well as by impracticable to obtain consent; and fourth, the organi-
health care sector representatives105 that most physicians zation informs the Commissioner of the use or disclo-
fall under the jurisdiction of PIPEDA. Only physicians sure beforehand.
‘‘employed by a government body or a non-profit agency
This exception may be relevant to physicians con-(e.g., a public hospital) that does not sell goods or ser-
ducting health research in the course of their patients’vices’’ 106 are thought to be exempt from the Act. The
treatment. The scope of this exemption has yet to bemajority of physicians – i.e., those who have private
clarified. Nevertheless, it can be argued that if the courtoffices and/or enjoy privileges at public hospitals and
agrees that ‘‘[a]ny bona fide health research, undertakenother health care facilities107 – would be expected to
by legitimate organizations111 under appropriate safe-comply with the personal information protection rules
guards, will . . . constitute ‘statistical or scholarly study orset out in PIPEDA.
research’ even if there is an element of pecuniary interest
To conclude the discussion on the applicability of involved’’, 112 physicians will not need patients’ consent
PIPEDA, it appears the best view is that the Act does not in order to use and disclose personal health information
apply to the core activities of public hospitals and ser- for the purposes of health research. Consent will still be
vices delivered by physicians employed by the latter, necessary though for the collection of such information.
whereas physicians having private offices or privileges at It should also be stressed that to be able to rely on the
hospitals are engaged in commercial dealings that will be scholarly research exception, physicians will have to
subject to the Act. Recent case law lends support to follow the conditions set out above.
expectations that PIPEDA will be interpreted narrowly. If
provincial personal data protection legislation is deemed Further on the issue of consent, the requirements in
to pass the ‘‘substantially similar’’ threshold, or PIPEDA is Principle 4.3 of Schedule 1 to the Act must be met.
declared inoperative due to its constitutional invalidity, Patients must be advised of the purposes of collection,
all public hospital activities and all types of physicians use and disclosure of the information, taking into
(along with private health care facilities, labs, etc.) will in account the patients’ reasonable expectations.
consequence be free from application of this federal Act.
In addition to the procedures related to the issue ofUnless PIPEDA becomes inapplicable, physicians (with
consent, doctors, as organizations113 responsible for per-the exception of those employed by public hospitals) 108
sonal information under their control, must put in placewill need to comply with it. A discussion of the require-
other procedures so that the rest of the principles inments for compliance follows below.
Schedule 1, such as accountability, identified purposes,
limited collection, use, disclosure, and retention, accu-
racy, security, and openness, are complied with.Procedures Required under PIPEDA 
First of all, physicians must have free and informed Doctors must also ensure that patients have access
consent from individuals to collect, use, and disclose to their personal health information. Access can be
their personal health information. 109 ‘‘Personal health denied in limited circumstances: if doing so would likely
information’’ is a defined term which means reveal personal information about a third party, if the
information concerning the physical or mental health of the information is protected by the solicitor–client privilege,
individual; information concerning any health service pro- if to give access would reveal confidential commercial
vided to the individual; information concerning the dona- information or could reasonably give rise to threateningtion by the individual of any body part or any bodily sub-
the life or security of other individuals. 114 If however, thestance of the individual or information derived from the
information can be severed, access must be given aftertesting or examination of a body part or bodily substance of
the individual; information that is collected in the course of severing.
providing health services to the individual; or information
that is collected incidentally to the provision of health ser- To help physicians cope with the new situation, the
vices to the individual. 110 College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario has pro-
For the purposes of the following discussion, per- vided health practitioners with some guidance as to
sonal health information will be treated as a subset of what practical measures must be implemented in order
personal information. to safeguard personal health information in the manner
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prescribed by the federal law. For example, it has been Application 
suggested that doctors implement
According to section 7 of PHIPA, the statute appliesphysical measures (e.g., restricted access areas, locked filing to:cabinets), organizational measures (e.g., need-to-know and
other employee policies, security clearances), and technolog-
ical measures (e.g., passwords, encryption, virus protection, (1) the collection of personal health information by
firewalls). 115 a health information custodian;
There are also recommendations with regard to the
(2) the use or disclosure of personal health informa-location and transfer of paper and electronic informa-
tion by a health information custodian or anytion, education of staff, review of agreements with con-
other person, to whom the information hassultants and contractors, and so forth. 116
been disclosed by the custodian;
If the provisions of PIPEDA imposing obligations to
(3) the collection, use or disclosure of a healthprotect personal information are contravened, an
number by any person.affected individual may file a complaint with the office
of the federal Privacy Commissioner. 117 If there are rea-
Thus, as far as personal health information is con-sonable grounds to investigate the matter, the complaint
cerned, PHIPA is intended to apply primarily to healthmay be initiated by the Commissioner. 118 In respect of
information custodians in the course of collection, useall complaints, whether filed by individuals or initiated
and disclosure of such information. PHIPA also has aby the Commissioner, proper investigations must be
very limited application to non-custodians when theconducted. 119 Unless the Commissioner is satisfied that
latter use or disclose personal health information dis-it is more reasonable or appropriate that the complaint is
closed to them by health information custodians. Thedealt with by other means, she must issue a report con-
new legislation applies to the use and disclosure of thetaining findings, recommendations or requests to the
personal health information even if collected beforeorganization whose practices have been under investiga-
enactment. 128 Further, the new Act applies to any per-tion. 120 After receiving the Commissioner’s report, the
sonal health information collected, used or disclosed bycomplainant, if not satisfied with the result, may further
a health information custodian, or used or disclosed byapply to the court121 which, in addition to any other
any other person, regardless of whether the custodian orremedies available in law generally, may order the organ-
the person in question is engaged in commercial activi-ization to correct its practices, as well as award damages
ties.to the complainant, including damages for any humilia-
tion suffered. 122
The term ‘‘health information custodians’’ refers to
Having outlined the main obligations imposed on persons who have custody or control of personal health
physicians by PIPEDA, I will continue my analysis by information as a result of or in connection with their
looking at the new Ontario legislation and its possible work, powers or duties, and includes a variety of individ-
effects. uals and organizations from health care practitioners to
all types of hospitals. 129 Clearly, physicians and public
hospitals, which have been the focus of this article, are
covered by the definition of health information custo-Impact of PHIPA 
dians.
PHIPA is an example of sectoral provincial personal
data protection legislation. As was noted above, apart A full and free exchange of information between
from Ontario, there are three other provinces – Alberta, health care practitioners, particularly physicians, and
Manitoba, and Saskatchewan – which have enacted stat- patients is a prerequisite for the provision of adequate
utes related to the protection of personal health informa- care and treatment. It will be impossible to either diag-
tion. None of these Acts has been declared to be substan- nose or treat ‘‘if the physician does not have all the
tially similar to PIPEDA. However, all three statutes – necessary information’’ about the patient. 130 Most of this
Alberta’s Health Information Act, 123 Manitoba’s Personal information is personal. Every time the patient goes to
Health Information Act, 124 and Saskatchewan’s Health see her doctor, the doctor collects patient’s personal
Information Protection Act125 – ‘‘have been variously health information (e.g., symptoms, family predisposi-
described as having very little to do with privacy and tions to certain illness, habits, etc.). The information col-
much more concerned with providing government and lected invariably needs to be used and disclosed in order
researcher access to confidential medical records’’. 126 to provide the patient with adequate therapeutic relief
PHIPA, on the other hand, is clearly an Act designed to (e.g., referrals to specialists or specific procedures such as
enhance protection of patient privacy and due to this the blood tests, ultrasound, X-rays, etc.). Hence, virtually all
federal government has already announced that the new health care-related activities are covered by PHIPA, and it
Ontario law will be deemed to be substantially similar to is critically important for all physicians and public hospi-
PIPEDA in the nearest future. 127 tals to be aware of the new Ontario Act’s implications.
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practitioners treating the patient, but they can alsoProcedures Established by PHIPA 
assume that a signed consent form relating to personal
health information is valid. 146 However, consent can noAdministrative Obligations 
longer be assumed to be ‘‘implied’’ if the custodianPart II of the Act131 imposes certain duties on health receiving the information is aware that the individualinformation custodians. First, there are a number of has expressly withheld or withdrawn the consent. 147 Theadministrative requirements. Each health information fact that ‘‘the rules for substituted consent for informa-custodian must have in place information practices, i.e., tion handling are very similar to those for substitutedpolicies in relation to the collection, use and disclosure consent for treatment’’ 148 has been noted as beingof personal health information, which include the among the positive effects of PHIPA as well.administrative, technical, and physical safeguards. 132
There are special rules on the handling of records. 133
Permitted Disclosure Health information custodians must appoint an infor-
mation officer, called ‘‘contact person’’, who is required The new Ontario Act sets out special rules for situa-
to act as the custodian’s agent to facilitate compliance tions when health information custodians are permitted
with PHIPA and communicate with the public. 134 The to collect, use or disclose personal health information
custodians must also describe their information practices without individuals’ consent. These rules mainly corre-
in a publicly available statement. 135 This statement must spond with analogous provisions in PIPEDA. As far as
outline how to reach contact persons, obtain access to or permitted disclosure is concerned, both PIPEDA and
request corrections of individual’s records, and make PHIPA provide, for instance, that information can be
complaints. Each health information custodian must disclosed without knowledge or consent of the indi-
take steps to ensure accuracy136 and security137 of per- vidual if it is prescribed, permitted or required by law.149
sonal health information. Generally, if personal health Another example is the disclosure of personal health
information is stolen, lost, or accessed by unauthorized information to a researcher for the purpose of research,
persons, a health information custodian must notify an provided that certain conditions are met. 150 Generally,
affected individual at the first reasonable opportunity. 138 the imposed conditions are considered to be met if a
Research Ethics Board has approved the researcher’s
research plan and the custodian and researcher haveConsent Provisions 
entered into an agreement before the disclosure of per-Further, PHIPA contains detailed provisions on con-
sonal health information in which the researcher agreessent and capacity to give consent to the collection, use or
to comply with the statutory requirements on the use,disclosure of personal health information. 139 Echoing
security and disposal of the information in question. 151PIPEDA, PHIPA provides that consent must be voluntary
‘‘Research’’ is defined in PHIPA as ‘‘a systematic investi-and knowledgeable. However, unlike PIPEDA, PHIPA
gation designed to develop or establish principles, factsestablishes ‘‘more workable consent procedures for the
or generalizable knowledge, or any combination ofcollection, use and disclosure of personal health informa-
them, and includes the development, testing and evalua-tion’’. 140 For instance, consent under PHIPA is ‘‘knowl-
tion of research’’. 152 This exception appears to be similaredgeable’’ if it is reasonable to believe that a person
to the scholarly research exception under PIPEDA.giving consent knows the purposes of the collection, use
However, the provincial Act goes beyond the federalor disclosure of personal health information and that
Act in that PHIPA, as was mentioned under the ‘‘‘Sub-consent may be given and withheld. 141 Unless it is not
stantially Similar’ Test’’ section of this article, provides forreasonable in the circumstances, it is presumed that the
more situations when personal health information is per-person knows the purposes of the collection, use or dis-
mitted to be disclosed without the patient’s consent.closure of personal health information if the custodian
Thus, health information custodians are permitted toposts or makes readily available a notice describing the
disclose the information to prescribed persons for pur-purposes where it is likely to come to the person’s atten-
poses related to providing health care153 and to elimi-tion or provides the person with such a notice. 142
nating or reducing risks of serious bodily harm;154 forConsent to the collection, use or disclosure of per-
health or other programs155 and for proceedings insonal health information about an individual may be
which custodians or their agents are parties or wit-express or implied. 143 Consent to disclosure must be
nesses; 156 for monitoring health care payments157 andexpress in only two situations: first, when a health infor-
allowing potential successors to evaluate operations ofmation custodian makes a disclosure to a person who is
custodians, 158 and for the analysis 159, planning and man-not a health information custodian and, second, when
agement of the health care system.160 In all of theseone health information custodian makes a disclosure to
situations, the Act appears to put reasonable restrictionsanother health information custodian for purposes other
on disclosure so as to ensure that personal health infor-than providing health care. 144 It follows then that in
mation is not disclosed for inappropriate, unreasonablegeneral terms, implied consent will be sufficient. To
or illegitimate purposes.demonstrate implied consent, public hospitals and physi-
cians can use ‘‘[a] poster or brochure readily available and
Access likely to be seen by a patient’’. 145
The legislation has been praised for the fact that not PHIPA gives patients a general right of access to
only can physicians assume implied consent for disclo- records containing their personal health information in
sure of personal health information to other health care the custody and control of a health information custo-
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dian. 161 In certain cases, access can be denied. One such examination of PHIPA reveals, however, that the dis-
case is when granting of the access can reasonably be charge of the obligations under the new Ontario law
expected to result in a risk of serious harm to the aligns more with the needs and traditions of the medical
patient’s treatment or recovery. 162 Such an exception to profession than under PIPEDA. Most significantly,
the general right of access to one’s personal information PHIPA provides for more workable provisions on con-
is not provided for in PIPEDA. sent. Thus, it can be argued that the new Ontario Act
suits interests of the health care sector better and, there-Generally, health information custodians have thirty
fore, should supercede the federal Act.days to process a request. 163 In certain situations, this
time period may be extended164 or reduced. 165 If a health
information custodian refuses or is deemed to refuse
access, the individual has a right to make a complaint to Conclusions the Commissioner. 166 Finally, custodians may charge
individuals fees for access. 167 The amount of the fee is, bligations created under PIPEDA and PHIPA not
however, limited to the prescribed amount or the O only codify rules found in common law, but also
amount of reasonable cost recovery, if no amount is go beyond that and introduce new concepts instigated
prescribed. 168 by new technological developments.
Until the new Ontario Act is deemed to be substan-Enforcement and Remedies tially similar to PIPEDA, and as long as PIPEDA is not
Part VI of the new Act outlines consequences of found to be constitutionally invalid, this federal Act
non-compliance with the requirements. They include applies in the provincial health care sector. While core
complaints to the Commissioner, 169 reviews, 170 and activities of public hospitals are not covered by the defi-
inspections. 171 The Commissioner under PHIPA is the nition of ‘‘commercial activity’’ in PIPEDA, activities per-
Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario formed by physicians in their private offices or in hospi-
appointed in accordance with the Freedom of Informa- tals where they have privileges are commercial in nature
tion and Protection of Privacy Act. 172 PHIPA enumerates and, thus, subject to PIPEDA. Physicians, with the excep-
powers of the Commissioner in relation to the protec- tion of those employed by public hospitals, and, in
tion of personal health information. 173 Generally, the extremely rare situations, public hospitals when engaged
Commissioner has powers to review complaints about in other than core activities such as care and treatment,
contravention of PHIPA or initiate her own reviews and must comply with the obligations under PIPEDA.
to make orders as a result of such reviews. Upon
As PHIPA applies to the whole health care sector, allreceiving the Commissioner’s order, an affected indi-
health care practitioners, including physicians, andvidual may appeal the order to the Divisional Court on a
health care facilities and public hospitals need to followquestion of law.174 When the order becomes final as a
rules established by the new Ontario Act. Due to the factresult of there being no further right of appeal, the
that the new Ontario Act meets all the criteria set out byaffected individual may commence a proceeding in the
Industry Canada, the federal government have alreadySuperior Court of Justice for damages for breach of pri-
declared that PHIPA will be deemed substantially similarvacy and mental anguish. 175
to PIPEDA. When the Proposed Order becomes effec-
Lastly, PHIPA provides for fines imposed on health tive, physicians and public hospitals in Ontario will be
information custodians and non-custodians, when the exempt from the reach of PIPEDA and, thus, will need to
latter are within the reach of PHIPA, for contraventions comply only with the requirements established by the
of the Act. 176 Natural persons are liable, on conviction, to provincial Act. In the meantime, compliance with both
a fine of up to $50,000, and organizations and corpora- pieces of legislation is required.
tions are liable, on conviction, to a fine of up to
Generally, obligations under PHIPA are similar to$250,000. 177
those under PIPEDA. The difference between the twoTo conclude on procedures under PHIPA, the obli-
Acts, in the author’s opinion, is that PHIPA better meetsgations imposed by the new Ontario Act largely
the needs of the health care sector in Ontario, as it isresemble those imposed by PIPEDA. Consequently,
tailored specifically for that purpose. The most signifi-‘‘most physicians who have developed privacy policies to
cant advantage of PHIPA is that it provides for morecomply with PIPEDA will only have to make minor
workable provisions on consent.adjustments to them as a result of PHIPA’’. 178 A close
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